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entral banks in larger industrialized countries increasingly favor
market operations, the buying and selling of securities, over stand-
ing facilities, such as lending and deposit facilities, in conducting
their monetary policies. In their market operations, foreign central banks
most commonly trade securities issued or guaranteed by their govern-
ments and repurchase agreements that are backed by a variety of assets,
including private securities and securities denominated in foreign cur-
rencies. Some also trade in securities that are issued by other govern-
ments or private securities that are guaranteed by governments or finan-
cial institutions. In some cases, these securities may be denominated in
foreign currencies.
Repurchase agreements (RPs) have come to account for most of the
market operations of these central banks in recent years and represent an
increasing share of their assets.1 This greater use of RPs partly reflects
their growing importance in financial markets and partly reflects their
ability to limit central banks’ credit, liquidity, and interest rate risks as
they expand their market operations to more assets and agents.
In most of the larger industrialized countries, the ratio of government
debt to GDP has been falling, in a few cases to unusually low levels. This
development has encouraged central banks to expand their trading of RPs
rather than other, riskier instruments. In anticipation of their impending
social security and pension deficits, the governments of some of these
countries have considered the merits of issuing more debt than they
require in order to maintain a market for their securities. 4 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
The Sample of Foreign Central Banks
Our survey covers the G-7 countries other than
the United States—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and Japan—plus the European
Central Bank and the central banks of Australia,
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. (See Tables 1 and 2
plus the reports for each country.) The current objec-
tives for monetary policy for the central banks of most
of the European and the three Commonwealth coun-
tries are forms of price stability. The central banks of
the Commonwealth countries have a relatively long
history of relying on market operations to conduct
their policies. The other European central banks and
the Japanese central bank relatively recently have
begun using market operations more intensively,
diminishing their reliance on discount, Lombard, and
deposit facilities for managing their supply of base
money and for influencing either interest rates or the
stock of money. In the past ten years, many of these
central banks have gained a greater degree of inde-
pendence from their governments.
Eligible Assets
The central banks in our survey tend to restrict
their list of eligible assets most for their outright pur-
chases. For the purpose of conducting monetary poli-
cy, most central banks may purchase securities denom-
inated in their currencies that have been issued or
guaranteed by their central government. Some may
purchase securities issued by their local governments.
Only a few, among them the central banks of Canada
and Japan, purchase longer-term government notes
and bonds. The Bank of England and the Bank of
Japan also may purchase private bills that are guaran-
teed by the banks that accept them. The Eurosystem
Table 1
Background Information on Government Finances and Money and Central Bank Assets 
in Selected Industrialized Countries
Euro- Switzer- United
Australia Canada system Germany France Italy Japan Norway Sweden land Kingdom
General information on 
governmenta finances
Government surplus/deficit  1.6 2.8 –1.2 –1.1 –1.8 –1.9 –7.0 4.9 1.9 –.6 1.1
(% of GDP, 1999)
Government structural surplus/deficit  1.3 2.9 –.7 –.3 –1.5 –.7 –6.0 –2.9b 2.1 n.a. .9
(% of potential GDP, 1999)
Governmentnet debt  13.8 55.3 58.1 47.0 43.0 104.4 37.7 –47.8 13.0 n.a. 38.7
(% of GDP, 1999)
Government gross debt  26.2 93.0 75.3 63.5 65.0 116.6 105.3 34.6 68.3 51.4 53.0
(% of GDP, 1999)
General information on 
money and central bank assets
M2 (national definition,  70.6 61.9 67.4 101.3 68.8 235.8 125.7 55.9 45.3 104.0 104.8
% of GDP, 1999)
Reserve money  5.2 4.8 6.4 7.5 3.7 26.2 18.1 7.0 5.2 12.7 4.3
(% of GDP, 1999)
Central bank assets  14.0 13.0 19.6 15.3 41.3 68.0 5.9 51.0 18.0 27.0 7.9
(% of GDP, 1999)
Central bank assets  53.6 13.9 26.0 24.1 63.5 40.8 5.6 147.5 26.4 52.5 14.9
(% of government gross debt, 1999)
a General government. 
b As a percentage of mainland potential GDP. The financial balances shown exclude revenues from oil production.
n.a. not available.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; OECD Working Paper No. 168, 1996.
1 RPs are contracts to sell securities wherein the sellers agree to
repurchase the securities at a specified date in the future for a speci-
fied price, which equals the original sales price plus interest for the
term of the contract. A standard RP contract is one example in a
broad class of reverse transactions that includes collateralized lend-
ing. The forms that reverse transactions assume are often dictated by
the laws and customs that govern the parties to the transaction. For
simplicity, the following generally refers to all reverse transactions
that are made at market rates of interest as RPs.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 5
can, and the Bank of France and the Bundesbank
could, buy high-quality, marketable private securities.
Nonetheless, at the end of the 1990s, the Bundesbank
held no securities outright, and the Bank of France
held only Treasury bills. Since the inception of the
European Central Bank (ECB), the Eurosystem of cen-
tral banks has not purchased securities outright in its
refinancing operations.
The balance sheets of the central banks in our
sample include longer-term and foreign-exchange
assets. Although these positions can represent assets
that central banks hold on behalf of their governments,
these positions also can represent their own assets. The
Eurosystem, the Bank of England, the Bank of Norway,
the Bank of Sweden, the Swiss National Bank, and the
Reserve Bank of Australia, for example, hold consider-
able foreign exchange assets, which they manage
according to benchmarks set by their respective gov-
erning councils and boards. These benchmarks typi-
cally dictate their positions in each currency, the aver-
age duration of their securities for each currency, the
average minimum quality of their credits, and other
characteristics of these assets.
The lists of eligible collateral for RPs (including
other reverse transactions, which can take the form of
sell/buy-back and collateralized loan agreements)
tend to be more liberal than those for outright pur-
chases. Some central banks either accept more securi-
ties through RPs or are considering doing so as the
supplies of their government’s securities dwindle rela-
tive to their GDP. In some cases, central banks have
responded to their counterparties’ requests to accept
more securities as collateral.
The securities that other central banks accept for
RPs are usually relatively liquid, easily valued, and
easily cleared through real-time-gross-settlement
(RTGS) and delivery-versus-payment (DVP) net-
works. The experiences of several banks suggest that
counterparties tend to offer their less-liquid eligible
collateral for RP financing. Foreign central banks
accept longer-term government securities as collateral
for RPs. In addition to the assets it is willing to pur-
chase outright, the Bank of England recognizes bonds
(denominated in either sterling or foreign currencies)
issued by its government and the debt of certain gov-
ernment and quasi-government agencies. Before the
creation of the ECB, Germany and France both accept-
ed private securities. Australia conducts foreign
exchange swaps in U.S. dollars. Canada recognizes
mortgage-backed securities that are guaranteed by the
government. Sweden also accepts certain mortgage-
backed securities and the debt of some foreign govern-
ments. Switzerland accepts debt denominated in Swiss
francs issued by quasi-government agencies and cer-
tain foreign banks. 
The ECB recognizes two tiers of collateral. The
first comprises marketable debt denominated in
euros issued by its members’ governments and cer-
tain private securities; the second includes additional
euro debt and some equities. Currently, about 96 per-
cent of the collateral used by banks in the
Eurosystem is in tier one, and the debt of govern-
ments and credit institutions each account for almost
half of this collateral.
Although most of these central banks formally
accept the same collateral for loans as they do for RPs,
in emergencies the list of collateral for loans is general-
ly even more liberal. An institution with eligible collat-
eral typically would not choose to pay the penalty of
pledging these assets as collateral for emergency
loans.
Market Operations and RPs
During the 1990s, most of the banks in this survey
began to execute much of their monetary policy
through market operations in RPs. The Bank of
Canada has used RPs since the 1950s. But the Bank of
England, the Bank of Japan, the Swiss National Bank,
the Bank of Sweden, and the Bundesbank greatly
expanded their use of RPs only in the past decade.
Since the inception of the ECB, the Eurosystem’s
refinancing operations in reverse transactions have
accounted for most of the growth of its assets. In these
operations, the Eurosystem provides funds against
collateral at a rate of interest that is determined by auc-
tion. Most of these reverse transactions take the form
of collateralized loans with an enforceable security
interest against pools of assets available to the national
central banks; the transfer of ownership of specific
securities occurs less often.2
Although the Eurosystem maintains a marginal
lending (Lombard) facility and a deposit facility in
order to set a ceiling and a floor for the overnight rate,
these facilities have not yet played a significant role in
the conduct of monetary policy. Since June 2000, the
ECB has set its lending rate 1 percentage point above
and its deposit rate 1 percentage point below the mini-
2 “Depending on both jurisdiction and national operating 
systems, national central banks allow for the pooling of underlying
assets and/or require the earmarking of assets used in each individ-
ual transaction.” (European Central Bank 2000, section 6.4.2, pp.
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mum bid rate announced for its main refinancing
operation. Throughout this period, the overnight
interbank rate, as measured by Eonia (Euro OverNight
Index Average), has remained within the corridor
defined by the lending and deposit rates, often within
one-half of a percentage point of the minimum bid
rate.3 Most of the other central banks also provide
lending and deposit facilities that define corridors 
for their policy rates—facilities, like those for the
Eurosystem, that are seldom used.
As money markets developed, market operations
became more efficient than standing facilities for the
execution of monetary policy, and, in turn, central
banks’ market operations could cultivate financial
markets. In this context, RPs suit the efficient execu-
tion of policy. RPs allow central banks to limit their
risks, adjust the terms of their transactions (amount,
maturity, frequency, and tender system) to match mar-
ket conditions, trade with more counterparties, and
expand the assets backing market operations, which is
especially appealing when the supply of short-term
government securities is insufficient. Because RPs
allow central banks to limit their risks as they expand
their range of eligible assets, they also mitigate the
need for these banks to define, manage, and maintain
their capital or valuation reserves.
Foreign central banks do not regard RPs as being
as risky as the outright purchases of the collateral that
backs the agreements. Most RPs mature within a
week or two. A few banks accept RPs with longer
maturities, ranging up to three months. For example,
the Eurosystem currently purchases two-week
reverse agreements at its weekly main refinancing
operations to supply about two-thirds of the base
money that it adds to the banking system. It supplies
much of the remainder through three-month reverse
agreements in its monthly long-term refinancing
operations.4 Most central banks mark the collateral
that backs their RPs to market daily and require their
counterparties to post additional collateral as
required. Most also impose margin requirements
(haircuts) that reflect the volatility of the market val-
ues of each type of collateral. All central banks
require their counterparties to meet capital require-
ments and satisfy acceptable credit standards. Some
banks limit their exposure to a counterparty accord-
ing to the amount of its capital. For most central
banks, eligible counterparties include commercial
banks, securities houses, and money market dealers.
Although, by statute, the Eurosystem can recognize
only institutions subject to its minimum reserve
requirement as eligible counterparties for its refinanc-
ing operations, securities houses and dealers that are
affiliated with banks may participate indirectly in
auctions through their affiliates.
The central banks’ increasing use of RPs, their
choice of eligible collateral, the terms under which
they accept this collateral, and their choice of coun-
terparties depend very much on the prevailing set-
tlement systems. For those assets that are covered by
efficient RTGS and DVP systems, the simultaneous
settlement of the securities and cash legs of transac-
tions minimizes credit risks, while permitting timely
and economical market operations. In principle, all
financial institutions that participate in these RTGS
and DVP systems can become potential counter-
parties for the central banks’ market operations.
Although the collateral requirements of RTGS and
DVP systems absorb securities, thereby tending to
increase central banks’ incentives for expanding
their lists of eligible collateral, in some countries, a
portion of the collateral held in these settlement sys-
tems can be released for overnight RPs with central
banks.
Maintaining the Supply of Government Debt 
The governments of Sweden, Canada, and
Australia recognize some merit in continuing to issue
government debt, even beyond their current budget
requirements, in order to maintain a continuous and
dependable market for their debt.5 By maintaining
their supply of debt, they also would relieve their cen-
3 Eonia is a weighted average of the interest rates on all
overnight, unsecured transactions for a panel of major financial
institutions in the euro area. Eonia has come close to the marginal
lending rate on some occasions and equaled the marginal lending
rate on April 17, 2001.
4 Reverse transactions accounted for less than one-third of all
the base money supplied by the Eurosystem at the end of the third
quarter. Claims on non-euro-area residents in foreign countries (pri-
marily foreign exchange reserves), gold, and gold receivables
accounted for almost one-half of the supply of base money. Unless
the Eurosystem begins buying a sufficient quantity of securities out-
right, however, the share of base money that it provides through
reverse transactions will continue to increase with time. In the
United Kingdom, for example, RPs represented about 85 percent of
the assets of the Issue Department of the Bank of England last year;
Treasury bills, the remainder (Bank of England 2000). The assets of
the Bank’s Issue and Banking Departments were nearly equal. As
the Issue Department continues to grow relative to the Banking
Department, a greater share of the United Kingdom’s base money
will be backed by RPs and bills.
5 Although most of the countries in our sample expect to
achieve budgets that reduce their public debt relative to their GDP
during the coming two decades, after this interval, their rising pen-
sion and social security obligations could entail substantial budget
deficits.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 9
tral banks from relying so greatly on other sources of
collateral as they, instead of their central banks,
acquired private and foreign assets. None of these
countries, however, has issued otherwise unneeded
debt for this purpose. Sweden has managed the struc-
ture of its government’s liabilities, both by maturity
and by currency, in a manner to promote the liquidity
of its kroner debt.
In Norway, the government both holds substantial
financial assets and has a gross public debt nearly equal
to one-quarter of its GDP. Norway’s government has
run substantial surpluses as a result of its oil revenues,
much of which it has retained in its State Petroleum
Fund and invested abroad. Because the remainder of its
budget has been in deficit, Norway’s public debt has
fallen only slightly relative to its GDP recently.
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